We study the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multiunit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel, one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper bound from 2 (Syrgkanis and Tardos in Proceedings of the 45th symposium on theory of computing (STOC '13), 2013) to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria of the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the multi-unit auction. We show that, for bidders with submodular valuations, the mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash equilibrium. The efficiency of this mechanism outperforms all the known bounds on the price of anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria in mechanisms used for multi-unit auctions. Finally, we analyze singleitem all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to contests and show tight bounds on the price of anarchy with respect to social welfare, revenue and maximum bid.
Introduction
It is a common economic phenomenon in competitions that agents make irreversible investments without knowing the outcome. All-pay auctions are widely used in economics to capture such situations, where all players, even the losers, pay their bids. For example, a lobbyist can make a monetary contribution in order to influence decisions made by the government. Usually the group invested the most increases their winning chances, but all groups have to pay regardless of the outcome. In addition, all-pay auctions have been shown useful to model rent seeking, political campaigns and R&D races. There is a well-known connection between all-pay auctions and contests [21] .
In particular, the all-pay auction can be viewed as a single-prize contest, where the payments correspond to the effort that players make in order to win the competition.
In this paper, we study the efficiency of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions with complete information, from a worst-case analysis perspective, using the price of anarchy [16] as a measure. As social objective, we consider the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the bidders' valuations. We study the equilibria induced from allpay mechanisms in three fundamental resource allocation scenarios; combinatorial auctions, multi-unit auctions and single-item auctions.
In a combinatorial auction, a set of items are allocated to a group of selfish individuals. Each player has different preferences for different subsets of the items and this is expressed via a valuation set function. A multi-unit auction can be considered as an important special case, where there are multiple copies of a single good. Hence the valuations of the players are not set functions, but depend only on the number of copies received. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively studied since the seminal work by Vickrey [24] . As already mentioned, all-pay auctions have received a lot of attention for the case of a single item, as they model all-pay contests and procurements via contests.
Contribution
Combinatorial Auctions Our first result is on the price of anarchy of simultaneous allpay auctions with item-bidding that was previously studied by Syrgkanis and Tardos [23] . For fractionally subadditive valuations, it was previously shown that the price of anarchy was at most 2 [23] and at least e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 [8] . We narrow further this gap, by improving the upper bound to 1.82. In order to obtain the bound, we come up with several structural theorems that characterize mixed Nash equilibria in simultaneous all-pay auctions. Multi-Unit Auctions Our next result shows a novel use of all-pay mechanisms to the multi-unit setting. We propose an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule inspired by Kelly's seminal proportional-share allocation mechanism [15] . We show that this mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient pure Nash equilibrium and no other mixed Nash equilibria exist, when bidders' valuations are submodular. As a consequence, the price of anarchy of our mechanism outperforms all current price of anarchy bounds of mixed Nash equilibria in prevalent multi-unit auctions including uniform price auction [18] and discriminatory auction [14] , where the bound is e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58.
Single-Item Auctions
Finally, we study the efficiency of a single-prize contest that can be modeled as a single-item all-pay auction. We show a tight bound on the price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria which is approximately 1.185. By following previous study on the procurement via contest, we further study two other standard objectives, revenue and maximum bid. We evaluate the performance of all-pay auctions in the prior-free setting, i.e. no distribution over bidders' valuation is assumed. We show that both the revenue and the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium are at least as high as v 2 /2, where v 2 is the second highest valuation. In contrast, the revenue and the maximum bid in some mixed Nash equilibrium may be less than v 2 /2 when using reward structure other than allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder. This result coincides with the optimal crowdsourcing contest developed in [6] for the setting with prior distributions. We also show that in conventional procurements (modeled by first-price auctions), v 2 is exactly the revenue and maximum bid in the worst equilibrium. So procurement via all-pay contests is a 2-approximation to the conventional procurement in the context of worst-case equilibria.
Related Work
The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in auctions has been a well-known fact (see e.g. [17] ). Existence of efficient equilibria of simultaneous sealed bid auctions in full information settings was first studied by Bikhchandani [3] . Christodoulou et al. [7] initiated the study of the (Bayesian) price of anarchy of simultaneous auctions with item-bidding. Several variants have been studied since then [2, [10] [11] [12] , as well as multiunit auctions [14, 18] . Recently, Feldman, Lucier and Nisan showed that, in first-price single-item auctions, correlated equilibria are always efficient and the price of anarchy of coarse equilibria is exactly e/(e − 1).
Syrgkanis and Tardos [23] proposed a general smoothness framework for several types of mechanisms and applied it to settings with fractionally subadditive bidders obtaining several upper bounds (e.g., first price auction, all-pay auction, and multi-unit auction). Christodoulou et al. [8] constructed tight lower bounds for first-price auctions and showed a tight price of anarchy bound of 2 for all-pay auctions with subadditive valuations. Roughgarden [20] presented an elegant methodology to provide price of anarchy lower bounds via a reduction from the hardness of the underlying optimization problems.
All-pay auctions and contests have been studied extensively in economic theory. Baye et al. [1] , fully characterized the Nash equilibria in single-item all-pay auction with complete information. The connection between all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests was proposed in [9] . Chawla et al. [6] studied the design of optimal crowdsourcing contest to optimize the maximum bid in all-pay auctions when agents' value are drawn from a specific distribution independently.
Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete on m items. Every player (or bidder) i ∈ [n] has a valuation function v i : {0, 1} m → R + which is monotone and normalized,
, and v i (∅) = 0. The outcome of the auction is represented by a tuple of (X, p) where X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) specifies the allocation of items (X i is the set of items allocated to player i) and p = ( p 1 , . . . , p n ) specifies the buyers' payments ( p i is the payment of player i for the allocation X). In the simultaneous item-bidding auction, every player i ∈ [n] submits a non-negative bid b i j for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are then allocated by independent auctions, i.e. the allocation and payment rule for item j only depend on the players' bids on item j. In a simultaneous all-pay auction the allocation and payment for each player is determined as follows: each item j ∈ [m] is allocated to the bidder i * with the highest bid for that item, i.e. i * = arg max i b i j , and each bidder i is charged an amount equal to p i = j∈ [m] b i j . It is worth mentioning that, for any bidder profile, there always exists a tie-breaking rule such that mixed Nash equilibria exist [22] .
The classes of the above valuations are in increasing order of inclusion.
Multi-Unit Auction
In a multi-unit auction, m copies of an item are sold to n bidders. Here, bidder i 's valuation is a function that depends on the number of copies he gets. That is v i : {0, 1, . . . , m} → R + and it is non-decreasing and normalized, with v i (0) = 0. We say a valuation v i is submodular, if it has non-increasing marginal values, i.e.
Nash Equilibrium and Price of Anarchy We use b i to denote a pure strategy of player i which might be a single value or a vector, depending on the auction. So, for the case of m simultaneous auctions,
. . , b n ) the strategies of all players except for i. Any mixed strategy B i of player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies.
For any profile of strategies, b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), X(b) denotes the allocation under the strategy profile b. The valuation of player i for the allocation X(b) is denoted by
The utility u i of player i is defined as the difference between her valuation and payment: 
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium)
Similarly, a mixed bidding profile B = × i B i is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for all bids b i and every player i,
Clearly, any pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the players for their received allocations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW (X) = i∈ [n] 
In Sect. 5, we also study two other objectives: the revenue, which equals the sum of the payments, i p i , and the maximum payment, max i b i . We also refer to the maximum payment as the maximum bid.
Definition 3 (Price of anarchy)
Let I be the set of all instances, i.e. I includes the instances for every set of bidders and items and any possible valuation functions. The mixed price of anarchy, PoA, of a mechanism is defined as
where E(I ) is the class of mixed Nash equilibria for the instance I ∈ I. The pure PoA is defined as above but restricted in the class of pure Nash equilibria.
Let B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given the rofile B, we fix the notation for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): G i j is the CDF of the bid of layer i for item j; F j is the CDF of the highest bid for tem j and F i j is the CDF of the highest bid for item j if we exclude the bid of player i. Observe that F j = k G k j and F i j = k =i G k j . We also use ϕ i j (x) to denote the probability that player i gets item j by bidding x. Then, ϕ i j (x) ≤ F i j (x). When we refer to a single item, we may drop the index j. Whenever it is clear from the context, we will use shorter notation for expectations, e.g. we use
Combinatorial Auctions
In this section we prove an upper bound of 1.82 for the mixed price of anarchy of simultaneous all-pay auctions when bidders' valuations are fractionally subadditive. This result improves over the previously known bound of 2 due to [23] . The proof itself might be of independent interest because we develop several structural properties of the mixed Nash equilibria. We first state our main theorem and present the key ingredients. Then we prove these ingredients in the following subsections.
Proof Outline
Here we present a (very short) sketch of the proof highlights of the upper bound.
Theorem 1
The mixed PoA for simultaneous all-pay auctions with fractionally subadditive bidders is at most 1.82.
Proof Sketch
We first illustrate the main ideas by focusing on a single item all-pay auction. W.l.o.g. we assume bidder 1 has the highest valuation v 1 among all bidders. First we came up with the following two lower bounds on the social welfare in equilibrium,
The first inequality is derived from the existing upper bound of 2 [23] . The proof of the second inequality is based on the structure of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions. By definition, we have 
by using 
The bound 1.82 can be derived by an optimal convex combination of these two lower bounds for SW (B). In order to generalize the proof from a single to multiple items, we introduce a notion, that we call expected marginal valuation denoted by v i j (x) for which we show that
This allows us to treat each item separately and get the improved upper bound for simultaneous all-pay auctions.
Full Proof
Proof Given a valuation profile For a fixed mixed Nash equilibrium B, recall that by F j and F i j we denote the CDFs of the maximum bid on item j among all bidders, with and without the bid of bidder i, respectively. Observe that
As a key part of the proof we use the following two inequalities that bound from below the social welfare in any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
Inequality (1), suffices to provide a weaker upper bound of 2 (see [8] ). The proof of Inequality (2) is much more involved, and requires deeper understanding of the properties of equilibria of the induced game. We postpone their proofs to Sect. 3.3 (Lemma 1) and Sect. 3.4 (Lemma 2) respectively.
By combining (1) and (2) we get
for any λ ≥ 0. It suffices to bound from below the right-hand side of (3) with respect to the optimal social welfare. For any cumulative distribution function F, and any positive real number v, let
Finally, we show a lower bound on R(F, v) that holds for any CDF F and any positive real v.
The proof of inequality 4 is given in Sect. 3.5 (Lemma 19). Finally, we obtain that for any λ > 0,
We conclude that the price of anarchy is at most 6λ+6 3+4λ−λ 4 1.82 by taking λ = 0.56.
Proof of Inequality (1)
This section is devoted to the proof of the following lower bound. 
With B being an equilibrium, we infer that
By summing up over all bidders, we have
The first equality holds because
. The second inequality follows because i b i j ≥ max i b i j and the last one is implied by the definition of the expected value of any positive random variable.
Proof of Inequality (2)
In this section, we prove the following lemma for any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
Lemma 2 SW (B) ≥ j∈[m]
First we show a useful lemma that holds for fractionally subadditive valuations.
Lemma 3 For any fractionally subadditive valuation function v, v(S) ≥ j∈[m] (v(S) − v(S\{ j})) .
Proof Let f be a maximizing additive function of S for the fractionally subadditive valuation v; then by definition v(S) = f (S) and for every item j it holds that
We will use the following technical proposition. 
In order to prove the proposition, we will minimize the left hand side of the inequality over all G i and g i , such that
We introduce the following notation:
.
Note that H = n i=1 H i . Our goal is to minimize H over all possible variables G i and g i under the constraints (5), and eventually show
Lemma 4 For every G and g that minimize H (·, ·) under constraints (5):
We prove Lemma 4, by proving Lemmas 5 and 6.
Lemma 5 Under constraints (5), if G and g minimize H (·, ·), then for every
Proof For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist G i < 1 and
As usual G −i j stands for G vector after eliminating G i and G j (accordingly for g −i j ). Therefore G and g are the same as G and g by replacing
Proof of the claim: Notice that
). So, we only need to show that
).
In the above inequalities we used that r > 1 and r 2 ≤
) . The claim contradicts the assumption that H (G, g) is the minimum, so the lemma holds.
Lemma 6 Under constraints (5), if G and g minimize H (·, ·), then for every
Proof For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist G i = G j = 1 such that g i = g j . We will prove that for g = (
which contradicts the assumption that G and g minimize H (·, ·).
Lemma 7
If H i = H j , then:
. By assumption:
which is true by the case assumption. Therefore, L is non-increasing and so it is
, therefore:
. However, for n ≥ 2,
, L is decreasing, so it is minimized for k =
Proof (Proposition 1) Let G and g minimize H (·, ·) and also let S = {i|G i < 1} and F = n t=1 G t . Moreover, given Lemma 4, for g i =ĝ for every i / ∈ S and j = arg min i∈S g i , H (G, g) can be written as:
Let g i = r i g j , for every i ∈ S. Since j = arg min i∈S g i , then for every i ∈ S, r i ≥ 1. By using Lemma 7:
, then:
+ n − |S| − 1 .
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that o j is the contribution of item j to the optimum social welfare. If player i is the one receiving item j in the optimum allocation, then A j = max x≥0 {F i j (x) · o j − x}. The proof of Lemma 2 needs a careful technical preparation that we divided into a couple of lemmas.
First of all, we define the expected marginal valuation of item j for player i. For given mixed strategy B i , the distribution of bids on items in [m] \ { j} depends on the bid b i j , so one can consider the given conditional expectation:
For a given B, let ϕ i j (x) denote the probability that bidder i gets item j when she bids x on item j. It is clear that ϕ i j is non-decreasing and ϕ i j (x) ≤ F i j (x) (they are equal when no ties occur).
Lemma 9 For a given B, for any bidder i, item j and bids x ≥ 0 and y
The second equality is due to
; the third one holds because b i j = y, and that other players' bids have distribution × k =i B k . The fourth one is obvious, since
is independent of the condition j ∈ X i (b ) and of the player i's bid on item j. Proof The lemma follows from the definition of Nash equilibrium; otherwise we can replace the bad bids with good bids and improve the bidder's utility.
Definition 5 Given a Nash equilibrium B, we say a bid x is good for bidder i and item j (or
b i j = x is good) if E[u i (b)] = E[u i (b)|b i j = x],
Lemma 11
Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j, good bid x and any bid y ≥ 0, 
Now we consider the difference between the above two terms:
The second equality holds since X i (b)\{ j} = X i (b )\{ j}; the third equality holds by Lemma 9. Finally, ϕ i j (x) > 0 for positive good bids follows by taking y = 0, since with ϕ i j (x) = 0 the left hand side of the inequality would be negative.
Next, by using the above lemma, we are able to show several structural results for Nash equilibria. Proof Suppose on the contrary that there is an ε > 0 such that for all x , such that
given that x is in the support), which contradicts Lemma 10.
Lemma 13 Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is in bidder i's support on item j, then there must exist another bidder k = i such that x is also in the bidder k's support on item j, i.e. for all ε >
Proof Assume on the contrary that for each player
Lemma 14 Given a Nash equilibrium
According to Lemma 13, there must exist a bidder k such that x is in her support on item j. We can pick a sufficiently small ε such that ε < (
This can be done since (x − ε) increases when ε decreases. Due to Lemma 12 there exists x − ε < x ≤ x such that x is good for bidder k and item j. Now we consider the following two cases for x . 
which contradicts Lemma 11. Here the first inequality holds because the probability that player k gets the item with bid x + ε is at least the probablity that he gets it by bidding x plus the probability that i bids x and gets the item (these two events for b −k are disjoint). The second inequality holds by case assumption, and the rest hold by our assumptions on ε and ε .
Lemma 15 Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and item j, ϕ
Proof The lemma follows immediately from Lemma 14. The probablity that some player k = i bids exactly x is zero. Thus F i j (x) equals the probability that the highest bid of players other than i is strictly smaller than x, and 1 − F i j (x) is the probability that it is strictly higher. Therefore ϕ i j (x) = F i j (x).
Lemma 16
Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j and good bids
Proof By Lemma 11, we have (
Combining these two inequalities, we have
Lemma 17 Given a Nash equilibrium B and item j, let T = sup{x|x is in some bidder's support on item j}. For any bid x < T , x is in some bidder's support on item j.
Proof Assume on the contrary that there exist a bid x < T such that x is not in any bidder's support. Then there exists δ > 0 such that
By the definition of supremum, there exists a bidder k such that for any ε > 0,
. By Lemma 10, there exists a good bid y + ∈ (y, y+ε] for bidder k and item j. We pick a sufficiently small ε such that (F k j (y + ) − F k j (y)) · v k j (y + ) < δ. This can be done since F k j is continuous by Lemma 14 and v k j is non-decreasing by Lemma 16.
which contradicts Lemmas 11 and 15.
Lemma 18 Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is a good bid for bidder i and item j, and F i j is differentiable in x, then
Proof Notice that v i j (x) = 0 by Lemma 11. By Lemmas 11 and 15, we have
− y for all y ≥ 0. So for any ε > 0,
That is,
,
The lemma follows by taking the limit when ε goes to 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 Since G i j (x) is non-decreasing, continuous (Lemma 14) and bounded by 1, G i j (x)
is differentiable on almost all points. That is, the set of all non-differentiable points has Lebesgue measure 0. So it will not change the value of integration if we remove these points. Therefore it is without loss of generality to assume G i j (x) is differentiable for all x. Let g i j (x) be the derivative of G i j (x), i.e. probability density function for bidder i's bidding on item j. Using Lemma 3, we have
The second inequality follows by the law of total probability, and the third is due to Lemmas 9 and 15. By Lemma 18 and the fact that
By concentrating on a specific item j, let S x be the set of bidders so that x is in their support. We next show that |S x | ≥ 2 for all x ∈ (0, o j − A j ]. Recall that A j = max x {F i j (x) · o j − x} for the bidder i who receives j in O. Let h i j = min{x|F i j = 1} (we use minimum instead of infimum, since, by Lemma 14, F i j is continuous). By definition h i j should be in some bidder's support. Moreover,
x is in some bidder's support and by Lemma 13 , there are at least 2 bidders such that x is in their supports.
By the definition of derivative, for all i / ∈ S x , g i j (x) = 0. Similarly, we have g i j (x) > 0 and G i j (x) > 0 for all i ∈ S x by definition 6. Moreover, for every i ∈ S x , x is good for bidder i and item j, since x is in their support. So, for any fixed
, and according to Proposition 1,
Merging all these inequalities,
Proof of Inequality (4)
In this section we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 19 For any CDF F and any real v > 0, R(F, v) ≥
3+4λ−λ 4 6 v.
In order to obtain a lower bound for R(F, v) as stated in the lemma, we show first that we can restrict attention to cumulative distribution functions of a simple special form, since these constitute worst cases for R (F, v) . In the next lemma, for an arbitrary CDF F we will define a simple piecewise linear functionF that satisfies the following two properties.
Once we establish this, it will be convenient to lower bound R(F, v) for the given type of piecewise linear functionsF.
Lemma 20 For any CDF F and real v > 0, there always exists another CDFF such that R(F, v) ≥ R(F, v) that is defined bŷ
where A = max x≥0 {F(x) · v − x}. 
where
We defineF l as follows.
It is straight-forward to check thatF(x) = lim l→∞Fl (x), as described in the statement of the lemma. We will show that for any l, Figure 1a illustratesF(x) (when we take the limit of l to infinity). By the construction ofF l , it is easy to check that 
v). Then the lemma follows by taking the limit, since R l (F, v) → R(F, v), and R l (F, v) → R(F, v).
by the monotonicity of CDF functions. Now consider another CDF function Q such that Q ( Figure  1b shows how we modify Q to Q . It is easy to check Q ∈ Q and 
By optimizing over t, the above formula is minimized when t = λ 2 ≤ 1. That is,
Multi-Unit Auctions
In this section, we propose a randomized all-pay mechanism for the multi-unit setting, where m identical items are to be allocated to n bidders. Markakis and Telelis [18] and de Keijzer et al. [14] have studied the price of anarchy for several multi-unit auction formats. The current best upper bound obtained was 1.58 for mixed Nash equilibria.
We propose a randomized all-pay mechanism that induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium, with an improved price of pnarchy bound of 4/3. We call the mechanism Random proportional-share allocation mechanism (PAM), as it is a randomized version of Kelly's celebrated proportional-share allocation mechanism for divisible resources [15] . The mechanism works as follows (illustrated as Mechanism 1).
Mechanism 1: Random PAM
Input: Total number of items m and all bidders' bid b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n Output: Ex-post allocations X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n and payments p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n if i∈ [n] We turn the x i 's to a random allocation as follows. Each bidder i secures x i items and gets one more item with probability x i − x i . An application of the Birkhoffvon Neumann decomposition theorem [4] guarantees that given an allocation vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) with i x i = m, one can always find a randomized allocation 1 with random variables
We next show that the game induced by the Random PAM when the bidders have submodular valuations is isomorphic to the game induced by Kelly's mechanism for a single divisible resource when bidders have piece-wise linear concave valuations. For convenience, we review the definition of isomorphism between games as appears in Monderer and Shapley [19] . Definition 7 [19] . Let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be games in strategic form with the same set of players
be the strategy sets in Γ k , and let (u i k ) i∈ [n] be the utility functions in Γ k . We say that Γ 1 and Γ 2 are isomorphic if there exists bijections φ i : for every
Essentially, g i is the piecewise linear function that comprises the line segments that connect f i (k) with f i (k + 1), for all nonnegative integers k. It is easy to see that g i is concave if f i is submodular (see also Fig. 2 for an illustration). We use identity functions as the bijections φ i of Definition 7. Therefore, it suffices to show that, for any pure strategy profile b,
, where u i and u i are the bidder i's utility functions in the first and second game, respectively. Let Given submodular functions ( f i ) i , let (g i ) i be the associated concave functions as defined in (6) . We can show the following equivalence between optimal welfares.
Lemma 21
The optimum social welfare in the multi-unit setting, with submodular valuations f = ( f 1 , . . . , f n ) , is equal to the optimal social welfare in the divisible resource allocation with concave valuations g = (g 1 , . . . g n ) , where g is derived from f as described in (6) .
Proof For any valuation profile v and (randomized) allocation A, we denote by SW v (A) the social welfare of allocation A under the valuations v. For any fractional allocation x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), such that i x i = m, let X(x) = (X 1 (x) , . . . , X n (x)) be the random allocation as computed by the Random PAM given the fractional allocation x. Also let o = (o 1 , . . . , o n ) and O = (O 1 , . . . , O n ) be the optimal allocations in the divisible resource allocation problem and in the multi-unit auction, respectively.
First we show that
Then it is easy to see that for every i,
Theorem 2 and Lemma 21, allow us to obtain the existence and uniqueness of the pure Nash equilibrium, as well as the price of anarchy bounds of Random PAM by the corresponing results on Kelly's mechanism for a single divisible resource [13] . Moreover, it can be shown that there are no other mixed Nash equilibria by adopting the arguments of [5] for Kelly's mechanism. The main conclusion of this section is summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Random PAM induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium when applied to the multi-unit setting with submodular bidders. Moreover, the price of anarchy of the mechanism is exactly 4/3.
Single Item Auctions
In this section, we study mixed Nash equilibria in a single item all-pay auction. First, in Sect. 5.1 we measure the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, showing tight results for the price of anarchy. Then in Sect. 5 .2, we analyze the quality of two other important criteria, the expected revenue (the sum of bids) and the quality of the expected highest submission (the maximum bid), which is a standard objective in crowdsourcing contests [6] . For these objectives, we show a lower bound of v 2 /2, where v 2 is the second highest value among all bidders' valuations. In the following, we drop the word expected while referring to the revenue or to the maximum bid.
We quantify the loss of revenue and the highest submission in the worst-case equilibria. We show that the all-pay auction achieves a 2-approximation comparing to the conventional procurement (modeled as the first price auction), when considering worst-case mixed Nash equilibria; we show in Sect. 5.3 that the revenue and the maximum bid of the conventional procurement equals v 2 in the worst case. We also consider other structures of rewards allocation and conclude that allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is the only way to guarantee the approximation factor of 2. Roughly speaking, allocating all the reward to the top prize is the optimal way to maximize the maximum bid and revenue among all the prior-free all-pay mechanisms where the designer has no prior information about the participants' skills.
Throughout this section we assume that the players are ordered based on decreasing order of their valuations, i.e. v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n .
Social Welfare
Our analysis is based on the characterization of the Nash equilibrium with single item by [1] . En route, we also show the price of anarchy is 8/7 for auctions with two players.
Theorem 3 The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at most 1.185.
Proof Based on the results of [1] , inefficient Nash equilibria only exist when players' valuations are in the form
, where players k + 1 through n bid zero with probability 1. W.l.o.g., we assume that v 1 = 1 and v i = v > 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Let P 1 be the probability that bidder 1 gets the item in any such mixed Nash equilibrium denoted by B. Then the expected utility of bidder 1 in b ∼ B can be expressed by
Based on the characterization in [1] , no player would bid above v in any Nash equilibrium and nobody bids exactly v with positive probability. Therefore, if player 1 deviates to v, she will gets the item with probability 1. By the definition of Nash equilibrium, we have
It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 2C in [1] , that E[b 1 ] is minimized when players 2 through k play symmetric strategies. Following their results, we can extract the following equations (for a specific player i):
recall that G i (x) is the CDF according to which player i bids in B. Since players 2 through k play symmetric strategies, G i (x) should be identical for i = 1. Then, for some i = 1,
Note that 1−v+x ≤ 1, and so we get
Now we can derive that 
is the probability of bidder i getting the item when she bids x, for every bidder i.
If player 1 bids any value x ∈ [0, v], her utility is
Bidding greater than v results in negative utility. Hence, B is a Nash equilibrium. Let P 1 be the probability that bidder 1 gets the item in B, then
When n goes to infinity, 
Revenue and Maximum Bid
In this section we bound the revenue and the maximum bid of the single-item allpay auction, for the case of mixed Nash equilibria. Specifically, the revenue and the maximum bid have value of at least v 2 /2 and this value goes to v 2 /2 when the number of bidders goes to infinity and v 2 /v 1 approaches 0.
Theorem 5 In any mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction, the revenue and the maximum bid are at least half of the second highest valuation.
Proof Let k be any integer greater or equal to 2, such that
be the CDF of the maximum bid h. By the characterization of [1] , in any mixed Nash equilibrium, players with valuation less than v 2 do not participate (always bid zero) and there exist two players 1, i bidding continuously in the interval [0, v 2 ]. Then, by [1] ,
. Therefore, we get
In the proof of Theorem 2C in [1] , it is argued that G i 1 (x) is maximized (and therefore the expected maximum bid is minimized) when all the k players play symmetrically (except for the first player, in the case that
The same lower bound also holds for the expected revenue, which is at least as high as the expected maximum bid. This lower bound is tight for the expected maximum bid, as indicated by our analysis, when k goes to infinity and for the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. In the next lemma, we show that this lower bound is also tight for the expected revenue. 
Lemma 22
where,
From the proof of Theorem 5 we can derive that
−1 , when k goes to infinity. By substituting we get,
By taking limits, we finally derive that lim v→0
2 For simplicity we assume v 1 = 1 and v 2 = v.
Finally, the next theorem indicates that allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is the best choice. In particular a prior-free all-pay mechanism is presented by a probability vector q = (q i ) i∈ [n] , with i∈[n] q i = 1, where q i is the probability that the i th highest bidder is allocated the item, for every i ≤ n.
Theorem 6
For any prior-free all-pay mechanism that assigns the item to the highest bidder with probability strictly less than 1, i.e. q 1 < 1, there exists a valuation profile and mixed Nash equilibrium such that the revenue and the maximum bid are strictly less than v 2 /2.
Proof We will assert the statement of the theorem for the valuation profile (1, v, 0, 0, . . . , 0) , where v ∈ (0, 1) is the second highest value. It is safe to assume that q 2 ∈ [0, q 1 ) 3 . We show that the following bidding profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium. The first two bidders bid on the interval [0, v(q 1 − q 2 )] and the other bidders bid 0. The CDF of bidder 1's bid is G 1 (x) = x v(q 1 −q 2 ) and the CDF of bidder 2's bid is
It can be checked that this is a mixed Nash equilibrium by the following calculations. For every bid
The expected revenue is
When v goes to 0, the revenue go to v(q 1 −q 2 )/2 < v/2 since q 1 −q 2 < 1. Obviously, the same happens with the maximum bid, which is at most the same as the revenue.
Conventional Procurement
In this section we give bounds on the expected revenue and maximum bid of the single-item first-price auction. In the following, we just write revenue and maximum bid instead of expected revenue and expected maximum bid, respectively. Proof Consider any mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and let h = max i {b i } be the highest bid; h is a random variable induced by B. For the sake of contradiction, assume that h is strictly less than v i with probability p > 0. Then, there exists ε > 0 such that h < v i − ε with probability p. Consider now the deviation of player i to pure strategy s i = v i − ε. s i would be the maximum bid with probability p and therefore the utility of player i would be at least p(v i − (v i − ε)) = p · ε > 0. This contradicts the fact that B is an equilibrium and completes the proof of lemma.
Lemma 24
In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if v is the highest valuation, any player with valuation strictly less than v has expected utility equal to 0.
Proof In [8] (Theorem 5.4), they proved that the price of anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria, for the single-item first-price auction, is exactly 1. This means that the player(s) with the highest valuation gets the item with probability 1. Therefore, any player with valuation strictly less than v gets the item with zero probability and hence, her expected utility is 0.
Consider the players ordered based on their valuations so that v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ v 3 ≥ · · · ≥ v n . In order to prove Theorem 7, we distinguish between two cases: i) v 1 > v 2 and ii) v 1 = v 2 . Proof If v 1 > v 2 , by Lemma 24, the expected utility of player 2 equals 0. From Lemma 23, the highest bid is at least v 2 with probability 1. Moreover, if there exist players bidding above v 1 with positive probability, then at least one of them (whoever gets the item with positive probability) would have negative utility for that bid and would prefer to deviate to 0; so, the bidding profile couldn't be an equilibrium. Therefore, the maximum bid lies between v 1 and v 2 .
Lemma 25
If we further assume no-overbidding, nobody, apart from player 1, would bid above v 2 . So, the same hold for player 1, who has an incentive to bid arbitrarily close to v 2 . Proof Due to Lemma 25, it is sufficient to show a tie breaking rule, where there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium with highest bid equal to v 2 . Consider the tie-breaking rule where, in a case of a tie with player 1 (the bidder of the highest valuation), the item is always allocated to player 1. Under this tie-breaking rule, the pure strategy profile, where everybody bids v 2 is obviously a pure Nash equilibrium, with v 2 being the maximum bid.
Lemma 26
If v 1 = v 2 , the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, equals v 2 .
Proof Consider a set S of k ≥ 2 players having the same valuation v 1 = v 2 = · · · = v k = v and the rest having a valuation strictly less than v. For any mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and any player i, let G i and F i be the CDFs of b i and max i =i b i , respectively. We define l i = inf{x|G i (x) > 0} to be the infimum value of player's i support in B. We would like to prove that max i l i = v. For the sake of contradiction, assume that max i l i < v (Assumption 1).
We next prove that, under Assumption 1, l i = l for any player i ∈ S and for some 0 ≤ l < v. We will assume that l j < l i for some players i, j ∈ S (Assumption 2) and we will show that Assumption 2 contradicts Assumption 1. There exists ε > 0 such that l j +ε < l i . Moreover, based on the definition of l j , for any ε > 0, G j (l j +ε ) > 0 and so G j (l j + ε) > 0. When player's j bid is derived by the interval [l j , l j + ε], she receives the item with zero probability, since l i > l j + ε. Therefore, for any bid of her support that is at most l j + ε, her utility is zero (G j (l j + ε) > 0, so there should be such a bid). Since B is a mixed Nash equilibrium, her total expected utility should also be zero. In that case, Lemma 23 contradicts Assumption 1, and therefore Assumption 2 cannot be true (under Assumption 1). Thus, for any player i ∈ S, l i = l for some 0 ≤ l < v.
Moreover, Lemma 24 indicates that no player i / ∈ S bids above l with positive probability, i.e. G i (l) = 1 for all i / ∈ S. We now show that for any i ∈ S, G i cannot have a mass point at l, i.e. G i (l) = 0 for all i ∈ S. Case 1. If G i (l) > 0 for all i, then p = i G i (l) > 0 is the probability that the highest bid is l, or more precisely, it is the probability that all players in S bid l and a tie occurs. Given that this event occurs, there exists a player j ∈ S that gets the item with probability p j strictly less than 1 (this is the conditional probability). Therefore, player j has an incentive to deviate from l to l + ε, for ε < (1 − p j )(v − l) (so that p j (v − l) < v − (l + ε)); this contradicts the fact that B is an equilibrium. Case 2. If G i (l) > 0 and G j (l) = 0 for some i, j ∈ S, then l is in the support of player i, but she does never receives the item when she bids l, since player j bids above l with probability 1. Therefore, the expected utility of player i is 0 and due to Lemma 23 this cannot happen under Assumption 1.
Overall, we have proved so far that, under Assumption 1 (that now has become l < v), G i (l) = 0 for all i ∈ S and G i (l) = 1 for all i / ∈ S. Since k ≥ 2, F i (l) = i =i G i (l) = 0 for all i. Consider any player i ∈ S and let u i be her expected utility. Based on the definition of l i , for any ε > 0, there exists x(ε) ∈ [l, l +ε], such that x(ε) is in the support of player i. Therefore, u i ≤ F i (x(ε))(v − x(ε)) ≤ F i (l + ε)(v − l). As F i is a CDF, it should be right-continuous and so for any δ > 0, there exists some ε > 0, such that F i (l + ε)(v − l) < δ and therefore, u i < δ. We can contradict Assumption 1, right away by using Lemma 23, but we give a bit more explanation. Assume that, in B, the maximum bid h is strictly less than v with probability p > 0. Then, there exists some ε > 0, such that h < v − ε with probability p. If we consider any δ < p(v − ε ), it is straight forward to see that player i has an incentive to deviate to the pure strategy v − ε . Therefore, we showed that Assumption 1 cannot hold and so the highest bid is at least v with probability 1. Similar to the proof of Lemma 25, nobody will bid above v in any mixed Nash equilibrium.
